When communicating using private and secure keys, there is always the doubt as to the identity of the message creator. We introduce an algorithm that uses the personal typing rhythm (keystroke dynamics) of the message originator to increase the trust of the authenticity of the message originator by the message recipient. The methodology proposes the use of a Rhythm Certificate Authority (RCA) to validate rhythm information. An illustrative example of the communication between Bob and Alice and the RCA is included. An algorithm of how to communicate with the RCA is presented. This RCA can be an independent authority or an enhanced Certificate Authority like the one used in public key infrastructure (PKI).
In this article, a formal specification and verification of the Rabin public-key scheme in a formal proof system is presented. The idea is to use the two views of cryptographic verification: the computational approach relying on the vocabulary of probability theory and complexity theory and the formal approach based on ideas and techniques from logic and programming languages. A major objective of this article is the presentation of the first computer-proved implementation of the Rabin public-key scheme in Isabelle/HOL. Moreover, we explicate a (computer-proven) formalization of correctness as well as a computer verification of security properties using a straight-forward computation model in Isabelle/HOL. The analysis uses a given database to prove formal properties of our implemented functions with computer support. The main task in designing a practical formalization of correctness as well as efficient computer proofs of security properties is to cope with the complexity of cryptographic proving. We reduce this complexity by exploring a light-weight formalization that enables both appropriate formal definitions as well as efficient formal proofs. Consequently, we get reliable proofs with a minimal error rate augmenting the used database, what provides a formal basis for more computer proof constructions in this area.