An Improved Method on Static Binary Analysis to Enhance the Context-Sensitive CFI
Abstract:Control Flow Integrity (CFI) is one of the most
promising technique to defend Code-Reuse Attacks (CRAs).
Traditional CFI Systems and recent Context-Sensitive CFI use coarse
control flow graphs (CFGs) to analyze whether the control flow
hijack occurs, left vast space for attackers at indirect call-sites. Coarse
CFGs make it difficult to decide which target to execute at indirect
control-flow transfers, and weaken the existing CFI systems actually.
It is an unsolved problem to extract CFGs precisely and perfectly
from binaries now. In this paper, we present an algorithm to get a
more precise CFG from binaries. Parameters are analyzed at indirect
call-sites and functions firstly. By comparing counts of parameters
prepared before call-sites and consumed by functions, targets of
indirect calls are reduced. Then the control flow would be more
constrained at indirect call-sites in runtime. Combined with CCFI,
we implement our policy. Experimental results on some popular
programs show that our approach is efficient. Further analysis show
that it can mitigate COOP and other advanced attacks.
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